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Review of Guido Imaguire, Russells Frühphilosophie: Propositionen, Realismus und die sprachontologische Wende, Georg Olms Verlag: Hildesheim-Zürich-NY, 2001, Reihe “Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie”, vol. 58, 227 + viii pages, € 58.
German philosophers were among the first to creatively assimilate Bertrand Russell’s philosophy. In 1908 Kurt Grelling and Leonard Nelson, two pupils of David Hilbert and Edmund Husserl in Göttingen, published the paper “Remarks on the Ideas of Paradox by Russell and Burali-Forti” in which the so-called Grelling paradox was first formulated. (Grelling and Nelson 1908) Hilbert made many efforts to establish a chair in exact scientific philosophy based on the model of the program for exact philosophy put forward by Russell.[1] Eventually he succeeded, and the newly founded chair was occupied by his protégé and friend Nelson in 1919. Soon after he received the chair, however, Nelson became obsessed with political activity against the rise of the right radicalism in Germany which absorbed all his powers – this to such an extent that he died of physical exhaustion in 1927 at the age of 45. (Torbov 2005) Grelling was estranged by the political strivings of his friend Nelson and soon moved to Berlin to work with Hans Reichenbach. Among other things, in 1929 he published the well-informed and insightful paper “Realism and Logic: An Investigation of Russell’s Metaphysics” in The Monist and in 1936 “The Logical Paradoxes” in Mind. At the same time, Grelling translated Russell’s The Analysis of Mind into German in 1927, The ABC of Relativity in 1928, The Analysis of Matter in 1929, and An Outline of Philosophy in 1930. It is highly probable that Grelling’s intensive work on Russell acquainted the other members of the Berlin Society for Empirical Philosophy, Reichenbach in particular, with Russell’s work and with philosophical realism in general.[2] Another example of the creative reception of Russell’s philosophy in Germany during this period is that of Rudolf Carnap. We know from his “Autobiography” that Russell’s influence on him was formative. Indeed, Carnap’s Der Raum (1922) and Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928) were, pace alternative claims by Michael Friedman and Alan Richardson, decisively inspired by Russell’s ideas.[3] Unfortunately, this tradition of productive reception of Russell’s philosophy in Germany was soon ended. Carnap moved in 1926 to Vienna and then to Prague, only to immigrate to the United States in 1936. After Hitler came to power in 1933, Grelling immigrated to Belgium but was subsequently captured by the Nazis and sent to Auschwitz where he died in September 1942. The situation in Germany today with regard to Russell studies is different from that of the early years of the twentieth century. It is true that for decades now, serious efforts have been made to revive analytic philosophy in the country. Unfortunately, Russell is not among the authors who are seriously investigated; he is used mainly for didactical purposes as propaedeutic. In line with these developments, many of Russell’s books have been translated into German. (So well developed were Russell studies in the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s in Germany that many Russell translations today simply remix translations of these years.[4]) Some of them, especially The Problems of Philosophy, are regularly discussed in undergraduate seminars of philosophy departments. This, however, scarcely promotes a profound knowledge of his philosophy. This state of Russell studies in Germany is reflected in the following two facts: (1) There are several publishing houses in the country which issue series on “Past Masters” in philosophy: Campus Verlag (Frankfurt), Junius Verlag (Hamburg), Beck Verlag (Munich), Herder Verlag (Freiburg), and Fischer Verlag (Frankfurt), among others. But there is no book on Russell in any of these series. The only introductory book on Russell in German today is the Ernst Sandvoss volume (Sandvoss 1980) published by Rowolt Verlag that appeared in the “Bildmonographien” series in which biographical data (with pictures), at the cost of philosophical analysis, have prominence. (2) Indeed, there are some good investigations conducted by German authors on early analytic philosophers. These early analytic philosophers are, however, all German-speaking authors. Such investigations are Wolfgang Carl’s book on Frege (Carl 1994) and Joachim Schulte’s books on Wittgenstein (Schulte 1992, 1993), which were both translated into English. Thomas Mormann’s book on Carnap (Mormann 2000) is also of good quality. Unfortunately, there is no book on Russell of a similar standing. The books on Russell published in Germany in the last decades are typically dissertations which demonstrate that the post-graduate student has reached a certain level of knowledge of parts of Russell’s philosophy (e.g., Bornet 1991,[5] Rheinwald 1988, and Tatievskaya 2005). They are anything but mature achievements in Russell studies. Even the newly published book One Hundred Years of Russell’s Paradox, edited by Imaguire’s dissertation supervisor, Godehard Link (Link 2004), does not disprove this claim. There are few German authors in it who discuss Russell’s paradox in the context of his philosophy.
Guido Imaguire’s recent book, Russell’s Early Philosophy: Propositions, Realism, and the Linguistic-Ontological Turn, is a typical example in this respect. It is the work of a young scholar who is familiar with Quine, David Lewis, and other recent analytic philosophers. He apparently sees his task as that of putting the philosophy of Russell in the scheme of analytic philosophy as he understands it. The knowledgeable student of Russell, however, can easily see that the author is entering the realm of Russell studies for the first time. Imaguire’s endeavor is apparently to outline and deliver a unifying picture of Russell’s philosophy. As we will see in the pages to come, he succeeds in this, though only at the cost of a series of oversimplifications. The author claims, in particular, that the whole philosophy of Russell is divided into two parts: before and after July 1905 and the composition of “On Denoting”. His philosophy before “On Denoting” is called by Imaguire “Russell’s early philosophy”, and his philosophy after this paper is called “Russell’s later philosophy”. According to Imaguire, Russell’s early philosophy was radically realistic, and his later philosophy moderately realistic. This moderateness is claimed to be a consequence of the use of Occam’s razor which does not tolerate the assumption of superfluous existences. (p. 188) Few readers will welcome these claims. (1) The mainstream interpretation of Russell, with which I agree, is that his philosophy can be divided most instructively in four periods: early, till his realistic turn and his acquaintance with the works of Peano (1898/1900); early middle, until he met Wittgenstein (November 1912); mature (1913-1919); later, which started with his embrace of neutral monism in 1919. (2) Russell started using the term Occam’s razor in print only in 1914. (Russell 1914, p. 112) The book profits from the newly published manuscripts in Volumes 2, 3 and 4 of Russell’s Collected Papers; it is actually the first book in German in which this new material is used. Furthermore, the book is strongly influenced by Peter Hylton’s 1990 Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy, and is also influenced by Paul Hager’s 1994 book, Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell’s Philosophy. Russell’s Early Philosophy has four chapters: Chapter 1, Propositional Realism – Chapter 2, Theory of Relations and Pluralism - Chapter 3, Foundations of Mathematics – Chapter 4, Critical Realism: Russell’s Linguistic-Ontological Turn. My impression is that Chapters 1 and 4 are organically connected and together state the main thesis of the book, while the other two chapters only deliver additional information about what the author calls “Russell’s early philosophy”. This point determines the order of my exposition of Imaguire’s book. After some general comments, I shall review Chapters 1 and 4 of the book, after which I shall go to Chapters 2 and 3.
According to Imaguire, the principal metaphysical position of Russell’s philosophy was that of realism. Russell started with a Platonic realism, and transformed it in 1905 into a kind of critical, or reductionist realism. (Only a few will find this claim of Imaguire’s convincing. Russell’s 1912 The Problems of Philosophy was still informed with a kind of Platonic realism.) This was a turn from naïve and extreme realism to a critical form of realism. (p. 216) The author further claims that the most important concept in Russell’s philosophy is that of a proposition. (p. 3) Russell changed the term “judgment” to “proposition” in his 1899 paper “The Classification of Relations” (Russell 1899) after his and Moore’s realistic turn of the summer of 1898. It is not by accident that in the same paper Russell introduced the logic of relations: the two conceptions are intrinsically connected. Russell’s method in philosophy is, according to Imaguire, that of analysis of propositions. (p. 2) This method constitutes the unity of Russell’s philosophy. (p. 3) This reflects the influence on Imaguire of Paul Hager’s book, in which Hager asserts that the unity of Russell’s philosophy results from the method of analysis (as such) and the role of relations in this analysis. There is not only unity in Russell’s philosophy, there are many changes as well. But a single method runs through all of these changes, and this is the method of analysis of propositions. The claim also holds true for all other aspects of his philosophy. Russell’s realism, his pluralism, and as well, his philosophy of mathematics are all run through with a certain kind of analysis of propositions. (p. 217)
The task of Chapter 1 is to show that the central concept of Russell’s investigation is that of a proposition. For this purpose Imaguire first reviews Moore’s and Bradley’s notions of a proposition. Russell introduced propositions into his ontology, following these two authors, in the summer of 1898 with his turn towards realism. My impression is that Imaguire primarily treats Russell’s propositions like those of the Austrian realists, in particular Meinong. Indeed, to Imaguire, Russell’s propositions are Meinong’s possible objects of judgments (p. 38) or his objective complex objects of judgments (p. 120); Imaguire compares them expressly with the concept of “states of affairs” of Reinach, Stumpf and Marty. (p. 34) This explains why Russell’s 1904 paper “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions”, and its critical 1905 pendant “On Denoting”, occupy such a prominent place in Imaguire’s book. Imaguire argues that Russell, in his early pre-1905 theory of propositions, accepts the view that there are entities which exist and other entities which subsist; objects in space and time exist, while abstract entities, such as propositions, subsist. Only contradictory objects, such as round squares, do not exist. Russell’s attitude towards contradictory objects distinguishes him from Meinong in 1904: Meinong embraces even them. Thus, Imaguire notes, existence and subsistence are primitive concepts for Russell. The objects in the world obtain their metaphysical status (as non-existing, existing, or subsisting) through their relation to these two primitive concepts. Further, a fact is an existing proposition. This means that it is not the facts (the world) which determine which propositions are true or false, but the other way round: the true propositions determine what exists in the world. Imaguire notes further that Russell’s identification of the sum of all true propositions with existence, also accepted in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, paves the way for the ontology of possible worlds. (p. 58) It remains unclear why Wittgenstein’s logical atomism was closer to the Russell of 1898-1903 than to Russell after 1905 (and especially to Russell from 1912-1918). Unfortunately, Imaguire fails to mention in his discussion of Russell’s propositions that these disappear from his writings with the introduction of the multiple relation theory of judgment around 1910. Another criticism of Imaguire’s treatment of Russell’s theory of propositions from 1898-1904 is that in the Principles, e.g. in §§ 43 and 65, Russell often speaks as if propositions consist of words. It is thus far from clear that his propositions are only ontological (non-linguistic) entities. It is also frustrating that the author is silent about the “Russellian propositions” introduced into recent discussion of propositional attitudes by David Kaplan as a way of explaining his notion of “direct reference”.
This chapter treats the most important turn in Russell’s philosophy, according to Imaguire – that of 1905. In “On Denoting”, Russell allegedly introduced the principle of ontological reduction, also called by Russell “Occam’s razor”.[6] The idea of logical construction plays a central role in the principle of reduction: indeed, only constructed entities can be reduced. (p. 201) That interpretation of Imaguire is certainly incorrect. Russell started to speak of “logical constructions” only in Principia Mathematica. Imaguire’s interpretation of “On Denoting” is made wholly in (Dummett’s interpretation of) Fregean terms. On the differences between Russell and Frege, so widely discussed in the literature, Imaguire says nothing. Here is his story: Until 1905 Russell believed that language is a “transparent medium” which gives us an unproblematic access to ontology. That is why he claimed that “the study of grammar ... is capable of throwing far more light on philosophical questions than is commonly supposed by philosophers.” (Russell 1903, § 46) Russell jettisoned this belief in “On Denoting” when he argued that there are defects in ordinary language. In particular, he showed that the form of a sentence hides and disguises the form of the proposition. That is why philosophers must concentrate their efforts on criticizing language. To be more specific, language must be purified in the direction of an ideal language. This was a real linguistic turn! In connection with these ideas of Russell, Imaguire sees the theory of descriptions as the beginning of a new critical realism. It critically views assumptions of existence which are suggested by the form of our particular language. (p. 194) This disproves naïve realism and establishes a much more consistent and moderate realism. This is due to the fact that “On Denoting” eliminates Meinong’s presupposition that there is a real object corresponding to every meaningful expression. (p. 185) This may be a fair appraisal of Russell, but calling Russell’s post-1905 realism a “critical” realism is at least a bad choice of words, since the expression has been used at least since 1916 to refer to American realists such as Roy Wood Sellars, George Santayana, and A. O. Lovejoy, who had little in common with Russell. The expression “critical realism” has also commonly been opposed to “direct realism”,[7] and as long as Russell had a theory of acquaintance, even after 1905, he is probably more of a direct realism than a critical realist in this latter sense of the term. In the last pages of his book, Imaguire claims that this interpretation also explains Russell’s philosophy from 1912-1918. The main change in his philosophy of these years was that Russell now eliminated the physical objects he accepted in The Problems of Philosophy and replaced them with logical constructions. According to Imaguire, all these developments were a consequence of ideas articulated in “On Denoting”. Finally, Imaguire takes the main claim of the theory of descriptions to be that denoting phrases never have meaning in themselves. (p. 183) With this claim, Russell accepted the context principle. I have three criticisms of this interpretation of “On Denoting”: (1) I do not believe that we can explain the changes in Russell’s philosophy of 1912-1918 in terms of his ideas expressed in “On Denoting”. There were other considerations (other tasks) in play now, some of them suggested by Wittgenstein. (2) Something similar to the context principle was already accepted in the Principles with the theory of denoting phrases which Russell elaborated after he became acquainted with the works of Peano. (There, he claimed that the terms in denoting phrases do not have meaning in isolation; their meaning is contextually determined.[8]) (3) Russell was always uncertain about the correctness of the context principle. So his logical atomism, as we find it in “On the Relations of Universals and Particulars”, Our Knowledge of the External World, and in some papers of Mysticism and Knowledge, accepts as atoms some individuals (particulars and universals). Only in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism did he accept facts as logical atoms. All this is evidence for the fact that Russell did not become an ardent supporter of the context principle in 1905.[9] Rather, his position on this point was ambiguous.
As already noted, Chapters 2 and 3 of Imaguire’s book are not a part of the main story which it tells. Here is the content of Chapter 2 in short: Russell used his thesis of irreducibility and hence thesis of the reality of relations in order to disprove idealism and to justify his propositional realism. (p. 61) In the Foundations of Geometry, he claims that the objects of cognition are complex: in order to know them, we must be able to differentiate them, and in order to differentiate them, they must be external (divergent) to one another. This is the principle of differentiation, which is based on the form of externality of individuals (i.e., “terms”). There are at least two forms of externality, space and time, which are most important for humans: indeed, two time-points can be different only when they are mutually external; in contrast, two events can happen together in time. This is our most fundamental a priori knowledge about space and so is the first axiom of geometry. Russell claims further that points are the main category of geometry; geometry is understood by him as investigating relations between points. (pp. 67 f.) This conception identifies geometrical and physical points. In his early philosophy of time[10] Russell criticizes people’s inclination to accept the view that time is a property, whereas space is a relation: This belief in the asymmetry between space and time is a prejudice. In fact, space and time have the same relational structure. (p. 70) At the end of this chapter Imaguire emphasizes that even before his anti-idealistic turn, Russell was convinced of the importance of relations and believed that they cannot be reduced to properties.
Chapter 3 of Imaguire’s book discusses Russell’s philosophy of mathematics in relation to his realism and his method of propositional analysis. Imaguire’s (neo-Fregean) thesis is that “the analysis of propositions is the methodological basis of Russell’s philosophy of mathematics” as well (p. 120). Indeed, Russell’s fundamental concepts of logic and mathematics originated and were founded in connection with the analysis of propositions. Imaguire substantiates his interpretation of Russell’s philosophy of mathematics with the fact that in the Principles Russell defines mathematics as the set of all absolute general propositions with the form of implication “p implies q”. Further, the essence of the proposition is the propositional function with a variable. Only when all constants except logical ones are replaced with a variable can a proposition reach the realm of mathematics. This means that only the introduction of variables, and the method of generalizing mathematics, which Russell accepted after he became acquainted with the work of Peano, made possible the transition from the theory of propositions to the theory of mathematical propositions. In a generalization typical of him, Imaguire claims that “English analytic philosophy initially came into being (and similarly in Germany for Frege) within the framework of the procedure of analysis of mathematical propositions.” (p. 121) In truth, Russell introduced the concept of “analytic philosophy” only in March 1911 (Russell 1911). Three years later, in Our Knowledge of the External World, it was characterized as being apart from other sciences and mathematics, a discipline which typically starts from complex and vague data, which are analyzed to simple but most general items. In contrast, science starts from what is simple, and its results are complex. (see Russell 1914, pp. 240 ff.) This description of analytic philosophy surely has little to do with the procedure of analysis of mathematical propositions.
The style of the book is worse then the book itself. Above all, there is a problem with the system of reference; in particular, Imaguire uses two different systems of reference. In some cases, he lists sources cited in the book in a six-page Bibliography printed at the end of the book. When a work from this list is cited, Imaguire puts the name of the author and the year of publication together with the page number of the cited material in brackets immediately after the citation. The problem is that he uses another method of reference along with this one, which places the references in footnotes. This confusion of two methods of reference in one book is annoying enough. Unfortunately, it is not the whole story. More than this, the author often mixes the two methods of reference into one. Then, he often cites sources according to the first method, but does not list the source in the bibliography. For example, on p. 198 he refers to a passage from “Smith 1985: 385” despite the fact that there is no “Smith” in the bibliography. The same failure is repeated on the next page, where he speaks of “Makin (1995)” despite the fact that there is no “Makin” in the bibliography. Only on p. 203 do we find the source “Janet F. Smith The Russell-Meinong Debate (1985)” in a footnote, though without the specification of where it was published. (In fact, it was published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 45, pp. 305-350.) Even worse, in some places the author simply gives false bibliographical information. For example, Gideon Makin is referred to on p. 195 n. 143 as “Gideon Making” and his paper “Making Sense of On Denoting” is claimed to have been published in 1985 when in fact, it was published in 1995 in vol. 105 of Synthese on pages 383-412. There are also problems with hyphenation: In several places, the first vowel is divided from the rest of the word, e.g., “E-xistenz” (pp. 34, 206). That kind of hyphenation is not acceptable in any European language. At other times, the words are not hyphenated at all (for example, “Propositionssubjekten [subjects of propositions]” on p. 188), so that the words in the line above are separated with enormous spaces between themselves. And with quotation marks, a passage is often started with German quotation marks only to end with English quotation marks. (see, e.g., p. 147) The index, shorter than two pages, is also strikingly poor. It combines, unusual for German standards, the index of names and of concepts into one. I have already mentioned that Imaguire often appeals to the authority of Peter Hylton, and occasionally also to that of Paul Hager. Unfortunately, we do not find these two names in the index nor the names of approximately two-thirds of the other authors referred to in the book. The concepts are even more badly indexed than the proper names.
In my comments above, I made a number of critical remarks about Imaguire’s book. In this last section of my review, I want also to emphasize that the author’s exposition of Russell’s thought is for long stretches clear and persuasive. Especially well written are parts of Chapter 2, an extract of which was recently published in Grazer Philosophische Studien. (Imaguire 2001) Students of Russell’s philosophy will find these fragments of Imaguire’s narrative interesting, even stimulating. Imaguire’s overall picture of Russell, however, has little to do with the real Russell. My guess is that Imaguire’s failure to give a true picture of the whole of “Russell’s early philosophy” is due only to the fact that his theme is too far flung for him at this stage. However, I can not preclude that after further study of Russell, he will deliver a more precise treatment of a part of Russell’s philosophy. His momentary failure shows only that Russell studies is a rather difficult field of investigation, in which academic excellence is only possible after many years of continuing efforts. [1] On Russell's influence on Hilbert in the years 1910-14 see Mancosu 2003. [2] Evidence for Reichenbach's substantial knowledge of Russell in these years is provided by his early paper (Reichenbach 1967), first published in German as "Bertrand Russell", Vossische Zeitung, December 2, 1928. [3]Richardson and Friedman claim, in contrast, that Carnap was primarily influenced by the German neo-Kantians of the period. (cf. Richardson 1998, Freedman 2000) For a critique on their thesis see Milkov 2004. [4] See Russell 2002, 2004. [5] Gérard Bornet’s dissertation was actually written and published not in Germany but in the German-speaking part of Switzerland. [6] For criticism of this view, see § 2, (2) above. [7] This sense of “critical realism” that was opposed to “direct realism” was widely used in German philosophy of the late nineteenth century as referring, e.g., to the realisms of Eduard von Hartmann, Alois Riehl, and Wilhelm Wundt. [8] Cf. Milkov 2003, p. 52. [9] See ibid. pp.81 f. [10] See Milkov 2005.
Bornet, Gérard: 1991, Naive Semantik und Realismus: eine sprachphilosophische Untersuchung der Frühphilosophie von Bertrand Russell (1903-04), Bern, Haupt. Carl, Wolfgang:1994, Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference: its Origins and Scope, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Friedman, Michael: 2000, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger, Chicago, Open Court. Grelling, Kurt: 1929, “Realism and Logic: An Investigation of Russell’s Metaphysics”, The Monist 39, 501-520. Grelling, Kurt: 1936, “The Logical Paradoxes”, Mind 45, 480-486. Grelling, Kurt and Nelson, Leonard: 1908, “Bemerkungen zu den Paradoxeen von Russell und Burali-Forti”, Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule, N.F. 2:3, 301-34. Hager, Paul: 1994, Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell’s Philosophy, Dordrecht, Kluwer. Hylton, Peter: 1990, Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Imaguire, Guido: 2001, “Die Form der Externalität in Russells An Essay of the Foundations of Geometry und die Ursprünge seiner Relationstheorie”, Grazer Philosophische Studien 61, 225-46. Link, Godehard (ed.): 2004, One Hundred Years of Russell’s Paradox, Berlin, de Gruyter. Mancosu, Paolo: 2003, “The Russellian Influence on Hilbert and His School”, Synthese 137, 59-101. Milkov, Nikolay: 2003, A Hundred Years of English Philosophy, Dordrecht, Kluwer. Milkov, Nikolay: 2004, “G. E. Moore and the Greifswald Objectivists on the Given, and the Beginning of Analytic Philosophy”, Axiomathes 14, 361-379. Milkov, Nikolay: 2005, “Russell’s Second Philosophy of Time (1899-1913)”, Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 13 (in press). Mormann, Thomas: 2000, Rudolf Carnap, München, Beck. Reichenbach, Hans: 1967 “[Russell:] An Early Appreciation”, in: Ralph Schoenman (ed.), Bertrand Russell: Philosopher of the Century, London, Allen & Unwin, pp. 129-33. Richardson, Alan W.: 1998, Carnap’s Construction of the World: The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Rheinwald, Rosemarie: 1988, Semantische Paradoxien, Typentheorie und ideale Sprache: Studien zur Sprachphilosophie Bertrand Rssells, Berlin, de Gruyter. Russell, Bertrand: 1899, “The Classification of Relations”, read before the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club on Jan. 27, 1899, in Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 2, London, Unwin Hyman, 1990, pp. 136-46. Russell, Bertrand: 1903, The Principles of Mathematics, London, Routledge. Russell, Bertrand: 1911, “Le Réalisme Analytique”, Bulletin de la société française de philosophie 11 (March 1911), 53-82. Reprinted in translation as “Analytic Realism” in The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 6, London, Routledge, 1992, pp. 409-32. Russell, Bertrand: 1914, Our Knowledge of the External World, London, George Allen & Unwin (2nd edition,1926). Russell, Bertrand: 2002, Einführung in die mathematische Philosophie, translated by E. J. Gumbel and W. Gordon in 1923, revised by Johannes Lenhard, Hamburg, Meiner. Russell, Bertrand: 2004, Unser Wissen von der Außenwelt, translated by Walter Rothstock in 1926, revised by Michael Otte, Hamburg, Meiner. Sandvoss, Ernst R.: 1980, Bertrand Russell, Hamburg, Rowolt Verlag. Schulte, Joachim: 1992, Wittgenstein: An Introduction, Albany, SUNY. Schulte, Joachim: 1993, Experience and Expression: Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Tatievskaya, Elena: 2005, Der Begriff der logischen Form in der Analytischen Philosophie, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag. Torbov, Zeko: 2005, Erinnerungen an Leonard Nelson 1925-1927, ed. and with an Introduction by Nikolay Milkov, Hildesheim, Olms Verlag. University of Pittsburgh Center for Philosophy of Science Pittsburgh, PA 15260 nikolay.milkov@uni-bielefeld.de |