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In 1905 Bertrand Russell published ‘On Denoting’ in the journal Mind. To state its topic as starkly as possible, the paper proposed a way of treating definite descriptions (singular referential expressions beginning with ‘the’) within the resources of what is now known as classical predicate logic (a branch of logic created by Gottlob Frege in 1879 which Russell had discovered in 1902) without treating them as names. In the course of doing so Russell provided an answer to the question he made famous: Is it true that the present king of France is bald? And, if it is not, do we conclude that he has a full head of hair? This may seem at best like an arcanely technical topic in formal logic and, at worse, the sort of concern with mere puzzles that can get philosophy a bad name, but the ramifications of Russell’s theory of definite descriptions—in logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics and epistemology, even in the way it was thought philosophy ought to be conducted—were enormous. Some people see the paper as inaugurating analytic philosophy; others as the paper in which analytic philosophy came of age; almost everyone would list it as one of the five most important philosophy papers written in the twentieth century. The centenary of Russell’s paper is being widely recognized: by a special issue of Mind; by a conference in Spain; by a new collection of articles on the theory; but above all by a major international conference at The Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster University—home of the Bertrand Russell Archives. When Russell’s theory was published, among its many achievements one of the most definitive was taken to be its demolition of an alternative treatment of definite descriptions, the theory of objects of the Austrian philosopher and psychologist, Alexius Meinong. If Russell became notorious for suggesting that it was false both that the present king of France was bald and that he was not bald; Meinong became notorious for suggesting that it was true both that the round square was round and also that it was square. For many decades after 1905, Meinong’s theory of objects was widely held to have been completely discredited by Russell. Since the 1970’s, however, Meinong’s theory has staged a comeback, so that it (or some variant of it) is now quite widely regarded as a serious competitor to Russell’s theory. The Russell Centre decided, therefore, to focus its conference on the Russell-Meinong debate and to invite both Russellians and Meinongians to the Centre to hash it out. The conference, ‘Russell v Meinong: 100 Years after On Denoting’, is being jointly organized by Dale Jacquette, a prominent contributor to the Meinong revival at Pennsylvania State University, and myself, another Meinongian I hesitate to confess in this journal. We have a stellar line-up of speakers from both sides of the debate, including Alasdair Urquhart, who edited Volume 4 of The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell (1994) which includes ‘On Denoting’ as well as Russell’s much more extensive pre-‘On Denoting’ manuscripts. On the other side, we have Rudolf Haller, one of the editors of Meinong’s collected works, the 7 volume Gesamtausgabe (1969-73), and one of the leading interpreters of Meinong’s philosophy. The publication of the collected works of both philosophers has played an important role in framing the recent debate between their respective proponents. In particular, the pre-‘On Denoting’ manuscripts make it clear that Russell’s motivation in creating the theory and his view of the theory’s importance were quite different from what they had been supposed to be. There can be few theories in the history of philosophy that have been so widely accepted and so evidently misunderstood. No one has made this clearer than another speaker at the conference, Gideon Makin in his wonderfully revisionary book, The Metaphysicians of Meaning: Russell and Frege on Sense and Denotation (2000). And lest readers fear that two cunning Meinongians have contrived to bring only Russell exegetes to a contest about the current value of the 2 theories, we also have Stephen Neale, the author of Descriptions (1990), for my money the best book on contemporary description theory and a tour de force from the Russellian point of view. The conference’s objectives are thus both systematic and historical. It will review what has been learnt in the last few decades about the origins of Russell’s theory, as well as reassessing the relative merits of Russellian and Meinongian approaches. But, because the impact of Russell’s theory of descriptions was felt so widely throughout analytic philosophy, the conference will take a wider view as well. For example, Russell’s initial engagement with definite descriptions was in many ways just a preliminary to a hoped-for paradox-free analysis of classes which would thus remove the last blockage on the road to a logicist analysis of number. David Bostock, the author of a 2 volume work on Logic and Arithmetic (1973, 1979), will speak on the development of Russell’s views on classes before and after the theory of descriptions. Ruth Barcan Marcus, the creator of quantified modal logic which is now seen as the obvious theory for dealing with some of the puzzles Russell attempted to solve by means of the theory of descriptions, will consider whether Russell remained as faithful as he claimed to the theory of descriptions in his later philosophy. Again, in ‘On Denoting’ Russell not only criticized Meinong’s theory of objects but also Frege’s theory of sense and reference. Jeffry Pelletier and Bernard Linsky in a joint paper will discuss Frege’s theory, and Nathan Salmon will discuss Russell’s main argument against that theory. The conference will thus explore some of the wider issues associated with the theory of descriptions. The ramifications of Russell’s theory are so extensive that it will be impossible for all of them to be addressed in the conference. We hope we will be able to achieve a good balance between specialized topics of current research on the theory, and papers on broader, related issues which will attract an audience beyond those working directly on the theory. Many other philosophers from around the world have also agreed to give papers. It has been thirty-two years since a conference of this size and importance was held in conjunction with the Russell Archives, the last one was to celebrate the centenary of Russell’s birth. The conference will be held on 14-18 May 2005, starting the same weekend that the Bertrand Russell Society holds its annual meeting at McMaster. It’s hoped that even the non-philosophers in the BRS will drop in for at least session or two to see what all the fuss is about. For further details of the centenary conference, see http://denoting.mcmaster.ca
—Nicholas Griffin
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