The 30th Annual
Meeting
of
The Bertrand Russell Society: Abstracts of Papers
at
Lake Forest College
555 N. Sheridan Road
Lake Forest, IL 60045
May 30 - June 1, 2003
Speaker: Tim Madigan, University of Rochester Press
Title: "Warrant Report: The Philosophical Analysis of 'The Warrant Report' by Bertrand Russell, Josiah Thompson, and Richard Popkin."
Abstract:
"The official version of the assassination of President Kennedy has been so riddled with contradictions that it has been abandoned and rewritten no less than three times. Blatant fabrications have received very widespread coverage by the mass media, but denials of these same lies have gone unpublished. Photographs, evidence, and affidavits have been doctored out of recognition." (From Bertrand Russell's "Sixteen Questions on the Assassination.")
It is a remarkable fact that three of the earliest and most influential critics of the Warren Commission's Report on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy were professional philosophers. Bertrand Russell, in early 1964, organized the "Who Killed Kennedy Committee", and befriended Mark Lane, author of the first serious critique of the Warrant Report, Rush to Judgment; Josiah Thompson, an assistant professor of philosophy at Haverford College, in 1965 wrote Seven Seconds in Dallas, which postulated the existence of a second gunman in the Dealey Plaza in Dallas; and Richard Popkin, the foremost authority on philosophical skepticism, in 1966 wrote The Second Oswald, which showed, using only the Warren Report itself as evidence, that there must have been at least two Lee Harvey Oswalds if all the various stories told by witnesses were to somehow make sense.
Speaker: Gregory Landini, Department of Philosophy,
University of Iowa
Title: "Tractarian Logicism" Abstract: In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein held the dogma that identity is not a
relation and that logical truths are tautologies. Though Wittgenstein never worked out a theory, he felt that his replacement of identity with exclusive quantifiers was among his
greatest triumphs. This paper argues that the Tractarian construction of numbers as "exponents of operations" was invented to preserve the logicism of Principia Mathematica in a way which avoids the Reducibility Axiom and rejects identity as a relation. Wittgenstein knew his construction meant facing the daunting task of rewriting Principia. In a discussion with Ramsey, Wittgenstein chided Russell's second-edition for ignoring his rejection of identity and not facing up to the task. But it will be found
that Wittgenstein was chagrined when Ramsey also came to think the approach unworkable. Ramsey's nominalistic semantics of "propositional functions in extension" aimed at a compromise concerning identity. Arithmetic truths are tautologies, and Reducibility can be avoided without a radical reformulation of Principia. Ramsey's nominalism is, however, unacceptable; and logic does not consist of tautologies.
But I shall suggest that the logic of exclusive quantifiers does assure the infinity of the Fregean numbers as second-level functions. If one can accept the metaphysical reality of one-one correlation without adopting an identity relation, then a version of Frege's logicism is saved. Speaker: David Blitz, Department of Philosophy,
Central Connecticut State University
Title: "Kant and Russell on the Transition from Just War to World Peace": Abstract: I argue that philosophy of war and peace has been central to the work of both Kant and Russell, in the following sense: (a) Kant's concept of "perpetual peace", rather than being a side issue of his old age, is essential even to the Critique of Pure Reason. There (at A751-2) Kant considered the strife between conflicting dogmatic claims, and the rejection of all such claims by skepticism, as a war-like stage of philosophy, to be resolved by determining both the scope and limits of reason -- the project of the critique of pure reason. Such a transcendence of the war-like state of the strife of systems would lead to a "perpetual peace" of the mind. (b) The notion of "perpetual peace" plays a crucial role as the end of cosmopolitan right in the Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant formulated the important notion of "jus post bellum" This supplements the traditional "jus ad bellum" and "jus in bellum" of just war theory, with the establishment of just peace treaties after wars which prepare the conditions for lasting world peace; thereby providing a bridge between just war and world peace. (The problem of unjust peace treaties leading to renewed war can be instanced today in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan). (c) Russell's non-absolute pacifism provides a similar bridge between the widely accepted just war doctrine, and the less widely accepted, but more important notion of world peace. Russell did not reject just war theory in its entirety, since his non-absolute pacifism required criteria for the justification of those exceptional conflicts whose necessity he admitted. However, Russell strengthened the criteria so as to exclude the vast majority of wars, and recognized that even those wars that are justified result, as in the case of the Second World War, from failure to establish lasting conditions of peace (the failure of the Versailles Treaty, ending the First World War) -- an obvious link to Kant's "jus post bellum".
As a result of these considerations, I argue that both Kant and Russell should be studied for their philosophies of war and peace, each of which is central to their overall work, and each of which essentially contains a project of transition from just war to world peace, projects which, moreover, are internally related. At a time when talk of "preventive war" has become dominant, it is all the more important to return to the projects of Kant and Russell, and update them for the 21st Century. Joint Discussion Speakers: Peter Stone, Political Science Department,
the University of Rochester and David White, Department of Philosophy,
St. John Fisher College
Title: "Is This Game Played?
A Conversation on Wittgenstein's Poker" Abstract: The recent best-seller Wittgenstein's Poker may be good journalism, but
that does not mean it is even minimally decent philosophical journalism.
.... Whatever one thinks of Russell's
popular works, they are still less misleading and less harmful than
superficially similar works by non-philosophers. Just how bad Wittgenstein's Poker is can best be shown not by arguing with it but
rather by setting along side it writings from within a few years of the
incident that, tell the interested lay reader all that needs to be known
about what Popper, Wittgenstein and Russell thought of each other. For this purpose we begin with (1) Popper's "The Nature of
Philosophical Problems and Their Roots in Science." (1952) [reprinted in
Conjectures and Refutations].... What did Wittgenstein think of Popper and of Russell in the post-war
period? Is brandishing a poker an appropriate expression of what he
thought? We (interested lay readers) can get a decent idea of what
Wittgenstein should have said to Russell and Popper by reading reviews of
Russell and Popper written by disciples of Wittgenstein....Malcolm's piece is particularly
instructive since it makes clear that while a Wittgensteinian would
disagree with Russell's philosophical position and would disapprove of
Russell's style in doing philosophy, it is only the latter that is treated
with scorn....As C. D. Rollins put
it, Wittgenstein was for many the model of "passionate dedication to
honest struggle." (Review of Malcolm's Memoir, JP 56 (1959) 283.) What did Russell and Moore think of Wittgenstein during this period?
Russell was certainly not ignorant of the later Wittgenstein since he
studied Wittgenstein's unpublished work prior to writing in support of
Wittgenstein's appeal for funding from Cambridge....Various commentators have
stressed how difficult it is to concentrate as intensely as Wittgenstein
required and how important it was to Wittgenstein that philosophy be taken
seriously. By this standard, Russell and Popper were neither
concentrating hard enough nor taking philosophy seriously enough. To the
extent there was an emotional clash it was because of this difference and
not because they disagreed over the use of such words as "problem" and
"puzzle." Just because certain philosophers cooperated in the writing of Wittgenstein's Poker,
it does not follow that Wittgenstein's Poker is a philosophy book as the publisher claims
nor does it follow even that the book is at worst harmless. We can see
the harm it has done already by looking at what is said in the numerous
reviews that have appeared in the popular press, and we can infer its
non-philosophical nature by noting that only one review of Wittgenstein's Poker is listed
in Philosopher's Index. Speaker: Anthony Anderson, Dept. of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara.
Title:
"The Axiom of Infinity in Russellian Intensional Logic" Abstract: In Principles of Mathematics Russell thought he could prove that there are
infinite classes. In section 339 he boldly declares "That there are infinite
classes is so evident that it will scarcely be denied. Since, however, it is
capable of formal proof, it may be as well to prove it." He goes on to cite
an argument in Plato's Parmenides and arguments by Bernard Bolzano and Richard
Dedekind which purport to demonstrate the existence of infinite classes.
Things have changed. To many it is certainly not evident that there are
infinite classes. And many would question the cogency of the arguments
Russell urges in Principles. Indeed, Russell himself would soon reject the
alleged proofs and in Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy he offers some
detailed criticisms of the reasoning accepted by Plato, Bolzano, Dedekind, and
by the earlier person stage of that improbable sequence of events we have
learned to call "Bertrand Russell." One thing I will do in this paper is to try to determine exactly what the
arguments of Bolzano and Dedekind were, making such improvements as seem
advisable, and to assess them from the point of view of the Russell of
Principles of Mathematics....Actually I will be reconstructing the arguments in "Russellian
Intensional Logic" -- the intensional logic implicit in Principles of
Mathematics but emended to take account of developments in Principia
Mathematica. It was Alonzo Church who began this project. It enunciates a
logic which Russell probably never actually held -- but could have and,
perhaps, should have. This work is therefore an example of what Robert Sleigh
(in Leibniz and Arnauld) calls "philosophical history." .... But my goal in trying to further
develop Church's Russellian reconstruction is pretty clear to me -- I think
that there is some appreciable chance that the resulting logic will turn out
to be the correct way to do intensional logic -- or at least a correct way to
do it. I am even more confident that some of the distinctively Russellian
ideas will be part of an adequate intensional logic although I believe that
some of Frege's conceptions will also play a role in the finished product.
.... First I will sketch the Russellian Intensional Logic proposed by Church --
with some modifications designed to avoid paradox and which in fact accord
better with Russell's intentions. It turns out to be possible to prove Axioms
of Infinity (in every type except the type of individuals) already in the
system as thus reconstructed. So Russell was right. But, I have argued
elsewhere, the intensional logic contains principles which it should not --
it's not sufficiently general in a way which I will briefly recount. (Here
then I have definitely urged a departure from Russell.) If the offending
principles are dropped, the proof of the Axiom of Infinity fails. So Russell
was wrong. However, if we develop the logic by adding some principles which
the Russell of Principles would clearly accept, we can formalize a version of
Bolzano's proof that there are infinite classes and so once more prove the
Axiom(s?) of Infinity. So Russell was right after all.... A Dedekind-type argument for the
infinite also has a plausible reconstruction in Russellian Intensional Logic
and is suggestive both on the formal and strictly philosophical sides. I will
defend the reconstructions of Bolzano, Dedekind, and the Principles Russell
against the criticisms of the later Russell. Moreover, the reconstruction of
Dedekind's argument is, I think, no longer subject to Patrick Suppes's
observation that "In no sense does this proof satisfy modern canons."
(Axiomatic Set Theory, New York, Dover publications, 1972, p. 138) .... Speaker:Cara Rice, Independent Scholar Title:
"The Beacon Light of Beacon Hill Shines On" Abstract: The ease with which the Russells were often able to operate their
school could easily surprise a skeptical observer or reader. Although
Beacon Hill eventually closed, this was arguably due to circumstances
beyond the Russells' control. The ideas on which the school was based
were sound.
This paper begins with a discussion of my personal experience at an
inner-city high school that was notably lacking in the conditions that
Russell deemed necessary for a school such as Beacon Hill to succeed. I
then speak of how what I witnessed at this inner-city high school was,
if anything, a more urgent need for the humanizing effects of ideals and
the beauty of the arts. I argue that there is little hope of teaching
someone a trade if they are so distressed and demoralized they do not have
the mental energy to learn.
This paper then turns to A.S. Neill's creation of a school considered
by most to be even more libertarian than Beacon Hill. The school's
operations are quite similar to those of Beacon Hill, and many of the
Russell's principles and theories are still in practice. I consider the
possibility that the survival of Summerhill is one of the best indicators
that the ideals behind Beacon Hill can survive. Speaker:Chad Trainer, Independent Scholar Title:
"Bertrand Russell's Assessments of René Descartes' Philosophy"
Abstract:
Bertrand Russell typically mentions René Descartes in a favorable context. But a case can be made that there are some aspects of Descartes' philosophy that Russell overrates and some that he underrates.
Some of Russell's assessments are predictable enough, such as his praise of Descartes' critical doubt and his charge that Descartes' Scholasticism was irreconcilable with what Descartes had learned from the contemporary science. But Russell seems to underrate Descartes' philosophy of universals and their metaphysical status. He also appears to short-change some aspects of Descartes' philosophy of "soul" as substance.
Russell, along with most historians of philosophy, overrates Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" argument when hailing it as "the kernel of Descartes' theory of knowledge" and that which contains "what is most important in his philosophy." Russell also refers to Descartes as "the first man of high philosophic capacity whose outlook is profoundly affected by the new physics and astronomy." This overlooks much headway made by some of Descartes' formidable predecessors.
I conclude with speculation on the reasons for Russell's assessments of Descartes, as well as some general remarks on Descartes and Russell.
Speaker:Kevin C. Klement, University of Massachusetts Title: "Russell and Wittgenstein on Type-Theory and Russell's Paradox"
Abstract:
Many interpretors the Tractatus read it as critical of Russell's type-theory and suggest that it offers a rival 'solution' to Russell's paradox. This prompts several questions. Is Wittgenstein's solution then not a type-theoretic solution? Is it of a totally different stripe than Russell's? If Wittgenstein's solution was different, why did Russell himself seem to think that Wittgenstein's work provided help for the theory of types? If instead, Wittgenstein's solution is broadly the same as Russell's, what precisely was Wittgenstein criticizing about Russell's type-theory?
In this paper, I argue that Wittgenstein's solution is, formally speaking, almost identical to Russell's. The apparent criticisms of Russell'stype-theory must be understood as internal criticisms that deal more peripheral issues regarding the nature of symbolism, the relative priority of linguistic and mental representation, and more general meta-philosophical differences, not the underlying core of Russell's position. While Wittgenstein did not believe in a hierarchy of different 'types' of entities, in the relevant sense, neither did Russell. For both, the hierarchy was one of types of meaningful expressions. This was true even of the type theory of Principia, developed before Russell met Wittgenstein. Symposium: Russell's Philosophical Development 1906-1918
Speaker #1: Rosalind Carey, Lake Forest College Title: The Intertwining of Logic and Psychology in Russell's Doctrine of Belief: An Overview and a Special Case Abstract: The goal of this talk is to show that an overlooked source of Russell's turn to bipolarity and negative facts lies in his 1913 reduction of not-aRb to disbelief in aRb, a view he publicly rejects in 1918 as being too psychological and not tied to a fact. Russell's turn to bipolarity marks one instance of a long evolution in his thought in which changes in his conception of the nature of logic and psychology intertwine with his evolving theory of belief. Thus a general goal of this talk is simply to display that interrelationship throughout its various stages (1906, 1908, 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1918) in Russell¹s thought.
Speaker #2:John Ongley, Northwestern University
Title:"Russell's Slow Progress to Realism"
Abstract:
One hundred years ago, Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore took a
public turn away from idealism and towards realism, in "The Principles of
Mathematics" and "The Refutation of Idealism" respectively, both published
in 1903. This marked the beginning of analytic philosophy. This turn is
usually understood as having occurred suddenly and just this once. However,
a careful look at Russell's writings between 1906 and 1918 will show that
the turn for him was gradual, and that he was still slowly progressing
towards a more and more realist position throughout the course of the
nineteen-teens. A focus on the development of Russell's theory of belief
will neatly illustrate this point. Speaker:David Taylor, University of Iowa, Winner of the Russell Paper Prize Abstract: