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Lehman College

John Cirace, Ph.D.

Office: Carman Hall, Room 374
Phone: 718.960.8388


  • Ph.D. in Economics, Columbia University
  • B.A. in Economics, Harvard University
  • J.D. in Law, Stanford University
  • Member of New York Bar since 1975


  • Professor of Economics, Lehman College, CUNY (1967 to present)
  • Adjunct Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School (1989 to present)
  • Visiting Professor, Brooklyn Law School, Brooklyn, NY (1987-1988)
  • Visiting Professor, Hastings Law School, San Francisco, CA (Spring, 1993)
  • Visiting Professor, Hamline Law School, St. Paul, MN (1983-85)

Professional Bio:

I am currently teaching Business Law I, Business Law II, and Commercial Transactions. I have also taught Introduction to Macroeconomics, Introduction to Microeconomics, Economic Statistics, and Industrial Organization. I have published 18 articles, the most recent of which is, When are Law and Economics Isomoporhic, 39 Golden Gate University Law Review 183-220 (2009). Outside of work, I like to swim, work out with weights, walk, read nonfiction, and go to movies and museums.

Published Articles

  • When are Law and Economics Isomorphic, 39 Golden Gate University Law Review 183-220 (2009).
  • The Theory of Economic and Legal Rationality, (Research Note) 4 International Advances in Economic Research 302 (1998).
  • An Interest Balancing Test for Entrapment, 18 Pace Law Review   51-81 (1998).
  • When Judges Balance Interests Through Trade-Offs, They Implicitly Use Economic Theory to Order Cases, 74 University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 27-62 (1996).
  • A Theory of Negligence and Products Liability, 66 St. John's Law Review pp. 1-71 (1992).
  • A Synthesis of Law and Economics, 44 Southwestern Law Journal 1138-1190 (1990).
  • Apportioning Damages Between Direct and Indirect Purchasers in Consolidated Antitrust Suits:  ARC America  Unravels the Illinois Brick Rule, 35 Villlanova Law Review 283-332 (1990).
  • Housing Market Instability and Rent Stabilization, 54 Brooklyn Law Review 1275-1280 (1989).
  • The Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the Dept. of Justice and the Nat'l Ass'n of Attys. Gen. Compared in the Context of Recent Merger.
  • Cases and Consent Decrees, 33 Villanova Law Review 281-333 (Spring, 1988).
  • Schizophrenia In The Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, 19 Antitrust Law & Economics Review 73-79 (No. 4 1987).
  • An Economic Analysis of the Danforth Product Liability Reform Bill, 10 Hamline Law Review 477-489 (1987).
  • An Economic Analysis of Antitrust Law's Natural Monopoly Cases,  88 West Virginia Law Review 677-728 (1986.)
  • When Does Complete Copying of Copyrighted Works For Purposes Other Than Profit Or  Sale, Constitute Fair Use? An Economic Analysis of the Sony B etamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases, 28 St. Louis University Law Journal 647-682 (1984).
  • An Economic Analysis of the "State-Municipal Action" Antitrust Cases, 61 Texas Law Review 481-515 (1982).
  • A Game Theoretic Analysis of Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Treble Damage Suits, 55 St. John's Law Review 42-62 (1980), cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S.Ct. 2061, 1064 note 6 (1981).
  • Five Conflicts Over Income Distribution in the Motion Picture-Television Industry, 25 Villanova Law Review 417-457 (1980).
  • CBS v. ASCAP: An Economic Analysis of a Political Problem, 47 Fordham Law Review 277-306 (1978), cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in BMI v. CBS,  99 S.Ct. 1551, 1568-1569 notes 15, 17 & 21 (l979).
  • Price Fixing, Privity, and the Pass-On Problem in Antitrust Treble-Damage Suits: A Suggested Solution, 19 William & Mary Law Review 171-201 (1977).